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Although the notion of a Kunstwollen excited the likes of Walter Benjamin and Karl 
Mannheim, most effort has not been spent on putting it to use but rather 
contextualizing and historicizing it. When Otto Pächt treated the concept in his 
celebrated article on Alois Riegl in 1962, he saw it less as a hermeneutic concept 
awaiting interpretation than a social scientific construct that helped solve historical 
problems surrounding art. In the same way that Pächt looked past Riegl’s changing 
terminology to the ideas of purpose and function, I want to do the same for him, 
and Sedlmayr).  
Switching to Kunstwollen as a social scientific idea and limiting its historical 
reference makes understanding it more tractable. Considering what Sedlmayr 
meant in 1929, when he published his Introduction to Riegl’s collected essays, or 
Pächt in 1962, is easier than Riegl in 1902. While written only a little more than 
twenty years after Riegl’s death, Sedlmayr’s idiom is closer to our own. If Riegl’s 
Kunstwollen begs for deep historicization, Seldmayr’s and Pächt’s instead calls for 
common sense informed by categories of thought. In fact, in the following I will 
read these essays through the lens of Gestalt-theoretical ideas. Sedlmayr and Pächt 
cite these but instead of taking him at his later actions, I take him at his word. What 
new meaning is provided taking Gestaltism into consideration?  
In the following, I outline a model of the Kunstwollen as a signature of 
formative processes at any given time. The shape of history in this model is not 
organic and Hegelian but monistic and empiricist. It is not that history at any 
moment is governed by a singular Geist but rather that each of its parts co-
determine each other. The first part of this paper is to contextualize the Kunstwollen 
and the second is to understand it as an evolving concept, first through Sedlmayr’s 
interventions in the late 1920s and then through those of his colleague Otto Pächt in 
his writing and lecturing in the 1960s and 1970s. Both Sedlmayr and Pächt treated 
the Kunstwollen as an evolving, naturalistic concept, and not as a category of formal 
philosophy, a la Hegel) and relied on the findings of psychology to inform it.  
 
Riegl and Kunstwollen 
 
There is a strong tendency, represented above all by E. H. Gombrich, to assimilate 
Riegl to Hegelian theorizing. Gombrich rejected Riegl’s highly abstract approach, 
which can be seen in the following quote from 1901:  
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The  transformation  of  the  late  antique  world-view  was  a  necessary 
transitional phase for the human spirit in order to arrive from the idea of a, 
in  the  narrower  sense)  purely  mechanical,  serial,  connection  of  objects 
projected on to a plane to that of an omnipresent chemical, space pervading 
connection.  Whoever  wants  to  regard  this  late  antique  development  as  a 
decline arrogates to himself the authority to prescribe today to the human 
spirit the road it should have taken to come from the ancient to the modern 
conception of nature.1 
 
Riegl could find cultural continuity in both the philosophy of Plotinus as well as a 
late Roman fibula, which Gombrich called ‘portentous nonsense.’2  
‘Kunstwollen’ has been interpreted in a number of ways, as ‘artistic volition’ 
or ‘aesthetic urge.’ Pächt pointed to the form of the verb, that which is willed by art. 
Fortunately,  thanks  to  the  scholarly  efforts  of  Margaret  Olin,  Margaret  Iverson, 
Diana  Reynolds,  and  most  recently  Mike  Gubser,  we  are  increasingly  able  to 
contextualize  Riegl’s  thought  within  the  Austrian  milieu  in  which  he  wrote.3 
Reynolds’ in particular has argued for a recontextualization of Riegl that includes 
attention  on  Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche  and  the  Brentanist  philosophical  tradition 
best known in Austria.  
  Riegl is perhaps clearest in the conclusion to the Late Roman Art Industry, 
where he wrote that:  
 
All  human  will  is  directed  toward  a  satisfactory  shaping  of  man's 
relationship  to  the  world,  within  and  beyond  the  individual.  The  plastic 
Kunstwollen  regulates  man's  relationship  to  the  sensibly  perceptible 
appearance of things. Art expresses the way man wants to see things shaped 
or colored, just as the poetic Kunstwollen expresses the way man wants to 
imagine  them.  Man  is  not  only  a  passive,  sensory  recipient,  but  also  a 
desiring,  active  being  who  wishes  to  interpret  the  world  in  such  a  way, 
varying from one people, region, or epoch to another) that it most clearly 
and obligingly meets his desires. The character of this will is contained in 
what  we  call  the  worldview,  again  in  the  broadest  sense):  in  religion, 
philosophy, science, even statecraft and law.4  
 
1 Alois Riegl, Die Spätrömische Kunstindustrie nach der Funden in Österreich-Ungarn, Vienna: K. K. Hof- 
und Staatsdrückeri, 1901, 216. 
2 E. H. Gombrich, "Response from E. H. Gombrich," in Gombrich on Art and Psychology, ed. Richard 
Woodfield, Manchester, 1996,  260.  
3 Margaret Olin, Forms of Representation in Alois Riegl’s Theory of Art, University Park:  Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1992; Margaret Iverson, Alois Riegl:  Art History and Theory, Cambridge, MA:  
MIT Press, 1993; Diana Reynolds, Alois Riegl and the Politics of Art History, PhD dissertation, University 
of San Diego, 1997; Michael Gubser, Time's Visible Surface- Alois Riegl and the Discourse on History and 
Temporality in fin-de-siècle Vienna, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006.  
4 Riegl, Spätrömische Kunstindustrie, 215; translation in Christopher Wood, ed., The Vienna School Reader: 
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The idea of mastery, meeting desire, is the crux of the Kunstwollen. Consequently, 
Adi Efel’s description of the Kunstwollen as a ‘regulator of subjectivity’ is very apt.5  
  Pächt argued convincingly that Kunstwollen is less abundant in the Dutch 
Group Portrait not because Riegl had superseded it but because this later period had 
more documented personalities: the generic Roman Kunstwollen becomes that of a 
definable artist.6 Consequently, it is clear th at the  Kunstwollen is not a monolithic 
concept  but  formed  of  group  life.  As  Jeffrey  Tanner  notes,  Riegl  observed  the 
coexistence of different Kunstwollen in the late Roman world, between the elites and 
plebeians) and also in sixteenth and seventeenth Low Countries, between Catholic 
and Protestants). Nevertheless, Riegl does make use of a concept of Volk. How much 
this  is a  totalizing concept,  however, is  open  to  interpretation.  Both  Tanner  and 
Viktor Schwartz have questioned Gombrich’s imputation of racial thinking to Riegl.7  
The key to understanding  Kunstwollen, however, is through Riegl’s larger 
idea of historical progress. A term that he uses, and which is repeated by Dvořák, is 
that of the ‘chain of development’, Entwicklungskette). Riegl already uses it in the 
Stilfragen and it is a guiding metaphor in the Moderne Denkmalkultus. When Riegl 
mentions  that  ‘everything  that  once  existed  constitutes  an  irreplaceable  and 
irremovable link in a chain of development’, he is echoing Buckle: ‘Every event is 
linked  to  its  antecedent  by  an  inevitable  connexion,  [every]  such  antecedent  is 
connected with a preceding fact…thus the whole world forms a necessary chain.’8 In 
other words, each successive step is determined by the first and could not have 
happened  as  it  did  had  any  of  the  earlier  links  not  preceded  it.  Indeed,  this 
methodological commonality can be confirmed through influence.9  
  It is necessary to pursue this line of inquiry, because Kunstwollen is 
hopelessly vague without this materialistic and positivist background. The idea that 
is taken for granted is that society is composed of tightly interlocking pieces. If that 
is the case, changes in one synchronic element will affect those in another 
 
5 Adi Efal, ‘Reality as the Cause of Art: Riegl and neo-Kantian-Realism’, Journal of Art Historiography 3, 
2010,  3-AE/1.   
6 See Alois Riegl, Group Portraiture of Holland, Evelyn Kain and David Britt, eds., Los Angeles: Getty, 
1999.  
7 Jeremy Tanner, ‘Karl Mannheim and Alois Riegl: From Art History to the Sociology of Culture’, Art 
History 32, 2009: 755-784; Viktor Michael Schwarz, ‘What is Style for?’ Ars 39, 2006,  21-32: ‘It should be 
mentioned that Ginzburg’s interpretation of Riegl’s idea of style as based on the category of race is 
misleading. Whereas Ginzburg translates that, according to Riegl, late-antique Christians and pagans 
belonged to the same ‘razza’, race and thus used the same style, Riegl says that they belonged ‘zu 
denselben Volksstämmen’, to the same tribes. In this way, he stresses that style was independent of faith 
but he also states that it was independent of belonging to a specific ‘tribe’ as well.’ Such a clarification 
of terminology is also extremely important for the 1930s, when some non-biological versions of ‘race’ 
circulated; see Bernhard Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Gestalt and Disclosure, 
Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007,  p. 135.  
8 Alois Riegl, Stilfragen: Grundlegungen zu einer Geschichte der Ornamentik, Berlin: George Siemens, 1893,  
344; Moderne Denkmalkultus: sein Wesen und seine Entstehung, Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1903,  2, 4, 6; 
Henry Buckle, History of Civilization in England, vol. I, 9.  
9 Reynolds, Alois Riegl and the Politics of Art History; cited by Gubser, Time’s Visible Surface, 106.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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synchronic element and likewise in the diachronic dimension. Part of the critique of 
Riegl as putative Hegelian can be found in the use of cultural details as symptoms of 
a larger whole. Thus Taine wrote:  
 
Just as in an animal, the instincts, teeth, limbs, bones, and muscular 
apparatus are bound together in such a way that a variation in the others, 
and out of which a skilful natural, with a few bits, imagines and reconstructs 
an almost complete body, so, in a civilization, do religion, philosophy, the 
family scheme, literature and the arts form a system in which each local 
change involves a general change, so that an experienced historian, who 
studies one portion apart from the others, sees beforehand and partially 
predicts the characteristics of the rest.10  
 
However, it is because a culture forms a tight whole that symptoms are accurate as 
predictors; they are actively formed by their neighbouring practices. To criticize 
such a model one must not attack its Hegelian assumptions but rather the very idea 
that societies form a coherent whole. One must move away from the imagery of a 
Hegelian ‘Geist’ imbuing a period, part of the rhetoric of ridicule) and make an 
ontological argument about the relative play of contingency and agency that upsets 
such closed wholes.  
  Similarly, in the diachronic sphere, it is important to note that such co-
related systems are not teleological. Nineteenth century examples of theories that 
posited causal, co-existing factors and not prescribing any pattern of development 
are those of Adolphe Quetelet, Henry Buckle, and Hippolite Taine. Buckle and 
Taine, while influenced strongly by the positivism and naturalism of Comte, 
nevertheless erased teleological elements from their theories in favour of a 
thoroughgoing determinism.11 Any worthwhile theory of history has to be 
functional and not teleological in this way. Indeed, philosophers of science insist on 
forming explanations of successive processes as abstractive moments with 
tendencies and not ad hoc or ceteris paribus laws.12  
 
10 Hippolite Taine, History of English Literature, New York: Colonial Press, 1900,  p. 22; Histoire de la 
litterature anglaise, Paris : Hachette, 1911,  vol. I, xl: ‘De même que dans un animal les instincts, les dents, les 
membres, la charpente osseuse, l'appareil musculaire, sont liés entre eux, de telle façon qu'une variation de l'un 
d'entre eux détermine dans chacun des autres une variation correspondante, et qu'un naturaliste habile peut sur 
quelques fragments reconstruire par le raisonnement le corps presque tout entier; de même dans une civilisation 
la religion, la philosophie, la forme de famille, la littérature, les arts composent un système où tout changement 
local entraîne un changement général, en sorte qu'un historien expérimenté qui en étudie quelque portion 
restreinte aperçoit d'avance et prédit à demi les caractères du reste.’   
11 Adolphe Quetelet, Physique sociale,, Brussels: C. Murquardt, 1869; Henry Thomas Buckle, History of 
Civilization in England, New York: Hearst's International Library, 1913,  Hippolyte Taine, Lectures on 
Art, trans. John Durand, 2 vols., New York: AMS, 1971; c.f. Maurice Mandelbaum, Purpose and Necessity 
in Social Theory, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987,  79-82.  
12 Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘Societal Laws’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Sciences 8, 1957: 211-24; 
James Woodward, ‘Developmental Explanations’, Synthese 44, 1980: 443-466.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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  As we shall see, there is some tension in Riegl’s thinking between a closed 
system, which would be teleological, and an apparently closed system. But in either 
case, it is not enough to criticize the idea of Zeitgeist when it is affirmed that certain 
things cannot happen at different times. This is not due to Hegelian factors of 
inconceivability but rather material factors owing to the necessity of forms to pass 
through intermediate material states, Riegl’s ‘transitional phase’). This ‘gradualist’ 
emphasis of the Vienna School can also be challenged but not for its cognitive 
factors. Instead one would have to challenge, once again, the idea that systems play 
out conservatively in time. Indeed, as I shall show, this was the exactly the challenge 
that Dvořák faced after Riegl’s death.  
 
Dvořák and Mannheim 
 
Max Dvořák inherited from Riegl the idea that distinct historical artistic forms must 
pass through intermediate stages. This was the basis of his early materialism and 
seeming organicism through his career. The fact that Dvořák regarded the art of the 
van Eycks as a ‘Rätsel’, anomaly) shows how beholden he is to such a materialistic 
approach.  His  phrase  clearly  echoes  those  of  Riegl  above:  ‘Every  historical 
formulation is a link in a specific historical chain of evolution and is conditioned by 
previous formulations of the same material. This is the premise and the justification 
of modern exact scholarship; without this, it would be a farce.’13 It is not that Dvořák 
ignored  politics,  religion  or  economics;  rather,  they  were  all  one  great  self-
modifying whole.  
As Dvořák’s career progressed, he loosened the grips of the Rieglian monism 
and began to allow the direct influence of different social formations. We already 
saw that Riegl was able to account for stylistic pluralism in late antiquity and the 
Dutch  Golden  Age  but  his  thorough-going  determinism  seemed  to  resist 
analytically  separating  different  influences  –  Christianity  for  example  –  into  an 
account  of  the  rise  of  Medieval  art.  In  his  ‘Idealism  and  Naturalism  in  Gothic 
Sculpture and Painting’, art becomes the manifestation of the Gothic worldview. 
History is made dialectical in the ‘contrast between the ideational and the material’, 
Gegensatz zwischen Geist und Materie).14 Viewing this historical system, rather than art 
being autonomous it is now in correspondence and in parallel with  the history of 
the spirit.  This is the true meaning of his ‘parallelism.’ It is not a non-doctrinaire 
form of Geistesgeschichte. Rather, forms are parallel because all cultural forms are 
parallel and part of the same whole.15  
 
13 Max Dvořák, Das Rätsel der Kunst der Brüder van Eyck, 1903, p. 167: ‘Jede geschichtliche Bildung ist en 
Glied einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Entwicklungskette und bedingt durch die vorangehenden Bildungen 
derselben Materie;’ cited in Pächt, Practice of Art History, 108.  
14 Max Dvořák, ‘Idealismus und Naturalismus in der gotischen Skulptur und Malerei’, in 
Kunstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte. Studien zur abendländischen Kunstentwicklung, München 1923, 41–
148. For this dialectical process see Hans Aurenhammer’s forthcoming book on Dvořák.  
15 Parallelism is therefore not to be preferred to a more aggressive causal approach but should be seen 
as a more archaic holism. Paul Crossley, in discussing this problem in Dvořák and Sedlmayr, is less Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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Dvořák abandoned a universal history of art but I think it is misleading to 
suggest that he broke down the totality of the art historical field ‘into a plurality of 
incommensurable practices.’16 It is important to note his retained commitment to a 
naturalistic and explanatory practice. What he relinquished is that it could come in a 
neat,  unilinear  package.  Here,  Vienna  theorizing  was  undergoing  a  clarification 
similar  to  that  found  in  Darwinian  and  Marxian  theorizing.  Already  Lenin  and 
Trotsky, not to mention the leading intellectual of Vienna Socialism, Max Adler, had 
criticized the standard teleology of Marxist thought and the Second International.17 
Darwin’s ‘evolutionary’ approach is popularly understood to be teleological, and 
was  misunderstood  as  such  by  Spencer)  but  in  its  pure  form  presumes  that 
populations adapting to conditions facing them, resulting in greater survival of a 
particular population.18 Darwin’s criticism of Lamarck was motivated precisely by 
his  functionalism,  a  form  of  teleology)  and  lack  of  true,  synchronic  form  to  his 
theories.19  Marx  is  popularly  seen  as  advocating  historical  inevitability,  but  a 
number of commentators on Marx have convincingly argued that the seemingly 
teleological and functionalist elements of his theories are mostly due to ‘sloppiness 
and rhetorical excess.’20  
What was at issue was precisely the idea of co-related practices, emphasizing 
‘process’,  ‘coexistence’  or  ‘cause’  over  teleology  and  functionalism.21  Riegl  had 
assumed that a social whole was the same as a temporal whole, and would conserve 
determinism. But naturally chance variations in Darwinian or voluntary action in a 
Marxian  system  introduce  unexpected  changes;  such  changes  can  still  be 
determined  without  everything  causing  everything  in  the  sense  of  Spinoza  or 
Laplace. It became clear that retroactive causal analysis of determination was not the 
same as prediction via a closed system, or that while effects are determined; whole 
                                                                                                                                            
happy with Sedlmayr’s abandonment of Dvořák’s ‘vague Weltanschauung’ for ‘specific cultural 
forces…not as parallels but as formative principles.’ Without defending Sedlmayr’s Entstehung der 
Kathedrale, it is actually less totalizing than Dvořák’s approach; ‘Medieval Architecture and Meaning: 
the Limits of Iconography.’ Burlington Magazine 130, 1988: 116-121.  
16 Matthew Rampley, ‘Dvořák: Art History and the Crisis of Modernism’, Art History 26, 2003, 221.  
17 Leon Trotsky, Our Revolution, trans. M. J. Olgin, New York: Holt, 1918 [originally published in 1906]; 
Max Adler, Kausalität and Teleologie im Streite um die Wissenschaft, Vienna: Brand, 1904.  
18 For a still useful discussion of misunderstandings of what evolution entails, see Thomas Munro, ‘Do 
the Arts Evolve? Some Recent Conflicting Answers’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 19, 1961: 407- 
417.  
19 In my view here, all functionalism is teleological. This should not be confused with my use of 
functional relation, which is synchronic. Functionalsim should also not be confused with a method 
based on function, means-end or adaptive principles, as in E. H. Gombrich’s work.  
20 Andrew Levine, Elliott Sober and Erik Olin Wright, ‘Marxism and Methodological Individualism’, 
New Left Review 162, 1987: 67–84, 74; reprinted in Erik Wright, Andrew Levine and Elliott Sober, 
Reconstructing Marxism: Essays on Explanation and the Theory of History, Verso Press, 1992.  
21 Gustav Bergmann, Philosophy of Science, Madison, 1957; Mandelbaum, ‘Societal Laws;’ C. G. Hempel. 
Aspects of Scientific Explanation, New York: The Free Press, 1965; Leon Goldstein, ‘Theory in 
Anthropology: Developmental or Causal?’ in Llewellyn Gross, ed.,  Sociological Theory: Inquiries and 
Paradigms, New York: Harper & Row, 1967,  pp. 153-80; Laird Addis, The Logic of Society: A Philosophical 
Study; Woodward, ‘Developmental Explanations.’   Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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events  are  not).  By  emphasizing  Dvořák’s  changes  at  the  hands  of  the  crisis  of 
modernity risks losing the continuity of thought from Riegl to Sedlmayr and Pächt, 
and also understanding how they addressed the problems thrown up by Dvořák’s 
response to the difficulties that Riegl faced.  
Lukács, and then Mannheim, became interested in Riegl and Dvořák for a 
model  of  cultural  production  that  superseded  the  ‘vulgar’  Marxist  mode  of 
reflection. First, however, it is necessary to say something about Erwin Panofsky, 
who contributed to the debate over the interpretation of the Kunstwollen.22 Panofsky 
reinterpreted  Riegl  on  broadly  neo-Kantian  lines  and  already  in  1929  Sedlmayr 
replied that all such attempts to link Riegl and Kant are like combining ‘chalk and 
cheese.’23 Subsequent commentators agree, for it is clear that Panofsky sought to 
change  all  that  was  interesting  in  Riegl  based  on  his  own,  different  critical 
prerogatives. As Jeremy Tanner notes, Panofsky was unhappy that Riegl had, 1) 
invoked  artistic  intention,,  2)  utilized  collectivist  concepts  and,  3)  made  the 
Kunstwollen  subjective.  Panofsky  turned  to  a  comfortable  Kantian  approach  to 
reverse these trends but it had the tendency of making Riegl unrecognizable.24  
  Panofsky’s later theory relied, partly, on Mannheim’s ‘On the Interpretation 
of Weltanschauung’, but he never refreshed with Mannheim’s later writings, which 
developed  Riegl’s  ideas  much  further.25  Mannheim,  in  fact,  returned  to  Riegl 
repeatedly and multiplied a number of Wollen throughout his work, now no longer 
restricted to the artistic sphere. What Mannheim recognized about the Kunstwollen is 
the way in which artistic, and by extension political actions, represent attempts to 
master, and by extension, represent) the world. They are ‘active volitions of subjects 
who  had  grasped  or  constituted  the  works  from  specific  standpoints  and  with 
specific  aspirations  or  commitments  which  shaped  the  character  of  their 
representation  of  the  world.’26  Mannheim  was  also  attractive  because  he  had 
answered Dvořák’s problem of development and determinism. In his Soziologie des 
Geistes,  c.  1933,    unpublished  then  but  reflecting  other  themes  in  his  work, 
Mannheim argued that, ‘we need not apply teleological hypotheses to history to 
realise the structural character of change.’27  
 
22 Erwin Panofsky, ‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens’, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine 
Kunstwissenschaft 14, 1920: 321-329; ‘The Concept of Artistic Volition’, trans. Kenneth J. Northcott and 
Joel Snyder, Critical Inquiry 8, 1981: 17-33.  
23 Sedlmayr, ‘Quintessence’, p. 27.  
24 Tanner, ‘Karl Mannheim and Alois Riegl.’ There is of course much more to say of Panofsky, 
especially the way in which Mannheim shaped his interpretive model, Tanner, Hart and the way in 
which Elsner claims that Sedlmayr actually contributed to his mature approach; c.f., ‘From empirical 
evidence to the big picture: some reflections on Riegl's concept of Kunstwollen’, Critical Inquiry 32, 2006,  
741-66.  
25 Karl Mannheim, ‘Beitrage zur Theorie der Weltanschauungs- Interpretation’, Jahrbuch fur 
Kunstgeschichte 1, 1921-22: 236-74 [appeared 1923]; ‘On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung’, From 
Karl Mannheim, ed. Kurt H. Wolff, New York, 1971.  
26 Tanner, ‘Karl Mannheim and Alois Riegl’, p. 761.  
27 Karl Mannheim, ‘Soziologie des Geistes’, c. 1931-33; ‘Towards the Sociology of the Mind’, Essays on 
the Sociology of Culture, New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 72.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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  Mannheim’s  continuation  of  Riegl’s  thought  is  extremely  compelling, 
capturing  as  it  does  the  motivation  of  behaviour.  Nevertheless,  his  extreme 
relationism does have its drawbacks, namely that his ontological relationism was 
carried also to an epistemological relationism; the relativity of being becomes the 
relativity of knowing. More concretely, if our viewpoint is always relative, how can 
we  step  out  of  that  viewpoint  to  obtain  objective  knowledge?28  Mannheim 
notoriously addressed this by exempting the natural sciences from his analysis, 
something that is not too far from Bourdieu’s own treatment today.  
In  spite  of  Mannheim’s  potential  shortcomings,  Dvorak’s  efforts  and 
Mannheim’s reinterpration of them accomplished two things. First, the discussion 
was effectively transferred from art theory to sociology. Indeed, Pächt would later 
continue to cite Mannheim. Second, Riegl’s monistic determinism was qualified as a 
weaker Gestalt process that still maintained mutual accommodation and, in concert 
with  current  debates  in  the  natural  and  social  sciences,  was  reinterpreted  as  a 
question of an agent’s motivation.  
 
Sedlmayr and Alfred Vierkandt 
 
This is the situation in which Sedlmayr and Pächt worked in the late 1920s. What 
has been missing in analyses of both of their works is the way in which they sought 
to answer the Viennese heritage of Riegl and the floundering of Dvořák. As we shall 
see, they used their interest in gestalt theory in both perception and social life to 
find a suitable theory of super-individual social life and artistic compulsion. In 
particular, they saw the natural discussion of social evolution – as did Mannheim – 
in the sociology of knowledge, Wissensoziologie,  a kind of move that had already 
been made by Max Adler, the Viennese socialist philosopher who interposed mind 
between social structure and consciousness.  
They each had recourse to the figure of sociologist Alfred Vierkandt, which I 
will show to be simply a way to model Kunstwollen as sociology of knowledge.29 
Indeed,  today  Vierkandt  is  remembered  as  a  phenomenologically -oriented 
sociologist along with Max Scheler, however, with a Berli n connection. And this is 
how  Sedlmayr  and  others  regarded  him  circa  1930.  Vierkandt  was  a  more 
satisfactory Mannheim, both of whom explored ‘objective mind.’  
 
28 This is the substance of Maurice Mandelbaum’s critique of Mannheim, Problem of Historical 
Knowledge: an Answer to Relativism, New York: Liveright, 1938; and also Vandenburghe’s of Bourdieu, 
‘’The Real is Relational:’ An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s Generative Structuralism’, 
Sociological Theory 17, 1999: 32-67.  
29 By Vierkandt, see most importantly his Gesellschaftslehre: Hauptprobleme der philosophischen Soziologie, 
Stuttgart: Enke, 1923; new edition, 1928. Sedlmayr refers to a 1926 edition but in Kunst und Wahrheit 
correctly cites the 1923 edition. A sympathetic interpretation is given by his, Jewish student, Dora 
Peyser, who was forced to flee Nazi Germany: ‘The Sociological Outlook of Vierkandt’, Australasian 
Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 15, 1937: 118–136. See also Raymond Aron, German Sociology, 
translated by Mary Bottomore and Thomas Bottomore, Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1957, 19-28.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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Vierkandt is cited by Sedlmayr in the ‘Quintessenz’ essay and Die Architektur 
Borrominis,  and  by  Pächt  in  ‘The  End  of  the  Image  Theory.’30  Vierkandt  was  a 
contested  figure  quickly.  As  Sedlmayr’s  correspondence  with  Meyer  Schapiro 
deteriorated,  Sedlmayr  contended  that  ‘I  don’t  care  about  Vierkandt  at  all’, 
suggesting some defensiveness.31 Later, Schapiro would justify what he thought to 
be  a  strange  juxtaposition  of  ‘idealist’,  Vierkandt,  Scheler)  and  ‘materialistic’, 
Reichenbach, Carnap) thinkers in Sedlmayr’s system, as if to suggest he is having 
his  cake  and  eating  it  too.32  Interestingly, however, apa rt from the use of the 
Gestaltist Lewin, Sedlmayr does not actually use Carnap and Reichenbach. Schapiro 
must  have  supplemented  from  his  own  memory  in  meeting  Sedlmayr  –  he  had 
mentioned in correspondence to Schapiro that he was interested in contributing to 
the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.33 In fact, 
Reichenbach is only cited in  Die Architektur Borrominis, appropriately, to refer to a 
probabilistic explanation.34  
Later, Hochstim, in the only extended discussion of Vierkandt, affirms that 
the  super-individual  affirmations  in  his  theory  prepared  the  way  for  Nazi 
Volksgemeinschaft.35  Similarly,  Sedlmayr’s  pupil,  Dittmann,  questioned  the  use  of 
Vierkandt in the strongest terms. Reacting to Vierkandt’s ethnographic placement of 
the  social  over  the  individual,  and  psychological  mechanism  of  ‘instinct  to 
submission’, Instinkt der Unterordnung,  he rejected any such social theory that seeks 
to undermine freedom, self-determination and self-responsibility.36 More recently, 
seemingly  with  Vierkandt  in  mind,  Jonathan  Petropoulos  mentions  Sedlmayr’s 
adherence  to  ‘collective  psychology’  while  Katharina  Lorenz  and  Jas  Elsner  call 
Sedlmayr  the  ‘real  apostle  of  a  Nazi  version  of  Kunstwollen.’37  What  was  so 
objectionable?  
 
30 See Hans Sedlmayr, ‘Die Quintessenz der Lehren Riegls’, in Alois Riegl, Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vienna: 
Filser, 1929; Eng. trans. ‘The Quintessence of Riegl's Thought’, in Richard Woodfield, ed., Framing 
Formalism: Riegl's Work, Amsterdam: G + B Arts International, 2001,  and Die Architektur Borrominis, 127. 
See Pächt, ‘The End of Image Theory’, p. 193, n. 1. Vierkandt is not cited in ‘Zu einer strenge’, 
presumably because Sedlmayr is not writing about Kunstwollen.  
31 Sedlmayr to Schapiro, 4 December 1934, Columbia University Library, New York: ‘ich schätze 
Vierkandt gar nicht;’ cited in Evonne Levy, ‘Sedlmayr and Schapiro Correspond, 1930-1935’, Wiener 
Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte 59, 2010: 235-263.  
32 Meyer Schapiro, ‘The New Viennese School’, Art Bulletin 18, 1936: 258-262.  
33 Sedlmayr to Schapiro, 19 April 1932, cited in Levy, ‘Sedlmayr and Schapiro Correspond.’  
34 It should be remembered some of the cited articles appeared in Symposion, edited by the gestalt 
psychologist Wilhelm Benary. Schlick, although he leaned toward positivism, was a critical realist and 
had been a student of Max Planck with Köhler. See Fiorenza Toccafondi, ‘Receptions, Readings and 
Interpretations of Gestaltpsychologie’, Gestalt Theory 3, 2002: 199-215 and Uljana Feest, ‘Science and 
Experience - Science of Experience: Gestalt Psychology and the Anti-Metaphysical Project of the 
Aufbau’, Perspectives on Science 15, 2007, 1-25.  
35 Paul Hochstim, Alfred Vierkandt: A Sociological Critique, New York, Exposition Press, 1966.  
36 Lorenz Dittmann, Stil - Symbol - Struktur, München, 1967, 145.  
37 Jonathan Petropoulos, The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 169; Katharina Lorenz and Jas Elsner, ‘Translators’ Introduction’, Critical Inquiry 
35, 2008,  p. 37, n. 9.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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Let us turn to Sedlmayr’s ‘Quintessenz’ essay where he specifically quotes 
Vierkandt from the Gesellschaftslehre, although reference is also made to the 1928 
reissue:  
 
[M]odern sociology has subsequently produced the nonatomistic theory of 
‘object spirit’, objektiven geist,  and in this theoretical context there appears 
the concept of an ‘objective collective will’, objektiven Gesamtwillens,  which 
matches perfectly the concept introduced by Riegl.  
  ‘The facts of human culture reveal the sway of a supra-individual 
spirit to an extraordinary degree.’38 Behind them stands a supra-individual 
will  that  the  individual  person  encounters  as  a  normative  force.  What  is 
being  talked  about  here  is  an  objective  will,  or  even  specifically  of  an 
objective collective will, Wille von überindividueller Art,  and this refers to a 
force that is rightly conceived of by the individual as an objective power. 
Clearly this is precisely what Riegl means.  
  Just  like  the  objective  spirit  this  supra-individual  will  is  borne  by 
groups  of  people.  And  although  it  is  neither  a  ‘substance  that  hovers 
mysteriously between specific individuals’, nor some phenomenon, in other 
words, something detectable in the conscious mental life of a single person 
such  as,  for  example,  individual  intentions,  it  is,  like  ‘spirit’,  Geist,  
something real and, further, an actual force, Kraft).39  
 
Vierkandt’s  subquotation  might  seem  startling in  the context  of  Sedlmayr’s  text. 
Because Vierkandt is seemingly not a gestalt or phenomenologial figure, it seems to 
be  a  moment  of  ideological  violence,  when  Sedlmayr’s  conservative  tendencies 
bubble to the surface. This is certainly how Dittmann, Hochstim, and now Lorenz 
and Elsner read them.  
  Nevertheless, Vierkandt would have seemed an at least partially naturalized 
‘gestalt’ figure to Sedlmayr. He taught with Wertheimer, Köhler and Lewin at the 
University  of  Berlin.  Because  he  worked  in  an  adjacent  field,  there  were  many 
opportunities to collaborate, if only for practical reasons like serving on dissertation 
committees.  For  example,  Walther  Schering  had  Wertheimer  and  Köhler  on  the 
committee for his 1925 dissertation overseen by Vierkandt: ‘Ganzes und Teil bei der 
sozialen  Gesellschaft.’40  Vierkandt  and  Köhler  were  also  on  Aron  Gurwitsch’s 
 
38 Vierkandt, Gesellschaftslehre, 343: „Im großartigsten Maße zeigt sich das Walten eines überindividuellen 
Geistes in den Tatsachen der menschlichen Kultur.’   
39 Sedlmayr, ‘Quintessenz:’ ‘Dieser ‚überindividuelle Wille’ ist ebenso wie der ‚objektive Geist’ 
getragen von einer Gruppe von Menschen. Und obwohl er weder eine »in mystischer Weise zwischen 
den Individuen schwebende Substanz’ noch etwas Phänomenales, das heißt in dem bewußten 
Seelenleben der einzelnen Individuen.’  
40 Christian Sehested von Gyldenfeldt, Von Alfred Vierkandt zu Carl v. Clausewitz: Walther Malmsten 
Schering und die Quellen gemeinschaftlichen Handelns in Frieden und Krieg, Munster: LIT Verlag, 2002, 12. 
See his ‘Gestalttheorie und Soziologie’ in Ethos. Vierteljahrsschrift für Soziologie Geschichts- und Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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Habilitation committee, and both expressed approval of his text – Die mitmenschlichen 
Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt – unfortunately unpublished because of the rise of 
Nazism.41  
  More importantly, Vierkandt had cited both Lewin and Köhler in the 2 nd 
edition  of  the  Gesellschaftslehre,  which  would  have  not  been  missed  by  either 
Sedlmayr or Pächt. Vierkandt repeatedly discusses the gestalt category and hardly 
Ganzheit at all. In spite of the fact that his overall approach to sociology is ‘formal’, 
this affinity to Ganzheit is more to do with the old-fashioned nature of his theory, 
rooted in nineteenth century categories, than in content. Vierkandt liked the Gestalt 
work of his colleagues but his paradigm hardly allowed him to express it. In short, 
the  decision to  cite  Vierkandt  –  independent  of  the  cited content,  which will be 
discussed now – is perfectly understandable.  
‘Objective  spirit’,  Objektiven  Geistes)  is  the  subject  of  section  36  of  the 
Gesellschaftslehre: ‘Die Bedeutung des objective Geistes.’ This concept is obviously of 
Hegelian origin and means ‘objective spirit’ or ‘objective mind.’ As such, it might 
appear  compromised  as  an  abstract  instrument  of  the  development  of  spirit. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  naturalized  as  a  sociological  concept  by  Wilhelm  Dilthey, 
Georg  Simmel,  and  Eduard  Spranger,  phenomenologists  like  Max  Scheler  and 
Nicolai  Hartmann,  cultural  historians  like  Hans  Freyer,  and  most  importantly 
Mannheim himself, to refer to a super-individual thought or content.42 There is in 
addition a Marxist strand leading from Hegelian Marxists like Luka cs to Adorno 
and Habermas, who writes of, ‘symbolically stored collective knowledge’ or just 
‘objectified culture.’43 The inoffensiveness of the term can be shown, horribile dictu, 
by  Karl  Popper’s  discussions  of  the  ‘objective  mind’  and  ‘World  III.’44  True,  the 
‘objective spirit/mind’ is the basis of related theories of the ‘group mind’, but the 
slipperiness of the term simply refers to external ‘objective’ facts. It is compatible 
with collective subjectivity of the group, but not with executive consciousness.  
                                                                                                                                            
Kulturphilosophie 11, 1926/7,  81-100. Schering would go on to become an expert on the war strategist, 
von Claussewitz, and wrote Nazi-friendly tracts.  
41 Aron Gurwitsch, Die mitmenschlichen Begegnungen in der Milieuwelt, Habilitation thesis of 1931, Ed. 
Alexandre Métraux, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1977.  
42 Wilhelm Dilthey, Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, ed. M. Riedel, 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981; Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, Leipzig: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1900; Eduard Spranger, Psychologie des Jugendalters, Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1927; Max 
Scheler, Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens, Munich and Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1924,  p. 
11; Nicolai Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins; Hans Freyer, Theorie des objektiven Geistes. Eine 
Einleitung in die Kulturphilosophie, 2nd edition, Leipzig, 1928; On Dilthey, see Austin Harrington, 
‘Dilthey, Empathy and Verstehen: A Contemporary Reappraisal’, European Journal of Social Theory 4, 
2001: 311-329.  
43 Gyorgy Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 1920, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971; Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 1970,  trans. R. 
Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997; Jurgen Habermas, Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, 1981,  vol. I, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy, 
Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.   
44 Karl Popper, ‘On the Theory of the Objective Mind’, in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1972; and John Eccles, The Self and its Brain, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1977.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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As Sedlmayr had recommended all of sections 38-40 to his readers, pp. 342-
366,  this quote could be seen as a chronological reading of Vierkandt’s text. Indeed, 
Sedlmayr sees the ‘objective collective will’, objektiven Gesamtwillens) as a subset of 
the Geist, the compulsion that is a result of it. This will, like the spirit, is super-
individual,  überindividuelle).  There  is  really  nothing  objectionable  about  this  and 
Pächt in his later lectures continued to refer to the ‘supra-individual’ nature of the 
Kunstwollen.45  The real question is whether or not this is an example of radical, 
indefensible holism, or merely institutionalism, or, alternatively, anti-reductionism). 
If, for Durkheim, ‘collective representations’ suggest an organic group mind, they 
may  still  for  Vierkandt  legitimately  suggest  super-individuality  and  collective 
subjectivity.  
If  we  contextualize  the  outright  prohibition  against  supra-individual 
reasoning as a libertarian aberration, we can see that this was necessary for any kind 
of collectivist explanation, including of a Marxist kind. Von Mises, influential on 
Hayek, Popper and Gombrich, says so much when he notes of Vierkandt: ‘Now this 
opinion  does  not  differ  essentially  from  that  of  Frederick  Engels  as  especially 
expressed  in  his  most  popular  book,  the  Anti-Dühring  nor  from  that  of  William 
McDougall and his numerous American followers.’46 Mises’ conflation of Marxism 
and  racist  hereditarian,  McDougall)  thinking  is  typical  of  libertarian  thought. 
Popper’s  unmerciful  critique  of  Mannheim  was  predicated  on  a  similar  unfair 
conflation of theoretical socialism and actual fascism.  
The main question behind all forms of legitimate collectivism is whether we 
need to reflect in theory, 1) the fact that entities, like numbers) do not exist solely in 
the mind, psychologism) and, 2) the fact that we do not merely act on the social and 
that sometimes it acts upon us, the duality of structure). As we have seen, the way 
to avoid individualism was through invocation of the successors of Hegel’s Geist. In 
other  words,  to  explain  class  exploitation,  we  need  collectivism.  According  to  a 
contemporary formulation of Levine, Sober and Wright, collectivism is needed to 
discuss  capitalism  as  a generic, ‘type’)  concept,  although  singular  discussions  of 
capitalism at any historical moment in a particular country, ‘token’) might make 
reference to individualistic data.47 For this reason, Nicos Hadjinicolaou found it fit to 
discuss Sedlmayr’s account of the Kunstwollen in his Marxist Art History and Class 
Struggle.48  
The  same may be said for the willed part of being under the power of 
objective mind or spirit. Because of the attunement of the group to the normative 
 
45 Otto Pächt, The Practice of Art History: Reflections on Method, translated by David Britt, New York: 
Harvey Miller, 1999,  131.  
46 Ludwig von Mises, Grundprobleme der Nationalokonomie: Untersuchungen uber Verhahren, Aufgaben und 
Inhalt der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftslehre, Jena: Fischer, 1933: Epistemological Problems of Economics, 
translated by George Reisman, Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1960,  lxviii.  
47 Levine, Sober and Wright, ‘Marxism and Methodological Individualism.’  
48 Nicos Hadjinicolaou, Art History and Class Struggle, London: Pluto, 1978, 64. Arnold Hauser properly 
notes the equal ontological stakes of recognizing ‘style’ and ‘capitalism’, both important but difficult 
abstractions.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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principle  to  which  they  belong,  there  is  a  compulsion  to  accept  that  norm.  The 
compulsion  behind  Riegl’s  Kunstwollen  refers  not  only  to  the  fact  that  we  are 
determined to do some particular thing, generic determinism) but are compelled at 
that moment to do that particular thing. It therefore occurs at the agent level, that is, 
the  level  of  individual  psychology,  but  via  the  attunement  to  the  collective 
subjectivity of the greater group’s first personal ‘we.’ Here, while this idea of the 
Gesamtwillen suggests ideas of mindless, crowd behavior, as in the case of a rich 
enough ontology to explain ‘capitalism’ or some other entity, here too the way in 
which groups of like minded people are united in activism, labor, or human-rights 
struggles is explained as well.  
 
Pächt and Metzger 
 
The name of Vierkandt does not appear again in the literature of Strukturforschung, 
which means principally in the work of Otto Pächt. We find him turning back 
instead to Mannheim or Simmel, but also interestingly looking aside 
contemporaneously to the gestalt psychologist, Wolfgang Metzger, 1899-1979). He 
does so in both his article on Riegl and also his Methodisches of c. 1970. Metzger 
provided Pächt with a satisfactory theory of the idea of compulsion in history in the 
idea of ‘creative freedom’, schöpferische Freiheit). This allowed him to continue along 
the path of naturalizing social science and reaffirm the notion of continuous 
evolution.  
  Because Metzger was an orthodox gestalt psychologist, I want to fill in some 
gaps in order to make it clearer the way in which Vierkandt had been improved 
upon, as suggestive as he was back in 1930. The ontological status of the group was 
not clearly delineated by Vierkandt. He strove to outline the extra-individual 
character of culture yet the result was so formalized and impersonal as to be hardly 
distinguishable from Durkheim’s system. A breakthrough was achieved by Kurt 
Lewin upon arriving in America, which Metzger knew, to regard the reality of a 
group not in a substantive way but upon the causal criterion of existence: something 
must be real if it has effects. This does not reify the group and anchors culture in 
individuals, but it points to the causal efficacy of groups to effect change in ways 
individuals cannot.49 Groups exhibit emergent properties that make their effects 
different from individual behavior, as recognized also by Lewin in noting the 
‘whole is different from the sum of its parts.’  
In the second case, Vierkandt was not phenomenological enough, ignoring 
important literature on the nature of group-sympathy. Collectives live in many 
ways: through their spokespersons, through the interaction of their members, but 
the idea of collective subjectivity goes to the very way in which group members 
identify with each other, and against others). This is the subjective side of the life of 
 
49 Kurt Lewin, Principles of Topological Psychology, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936,  19: ‘What is 
real is what has effects;’ c.f., Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd edn., London/New York: Routledge , 1998.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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groups. Groups do have a mental or ‘spiritual’ link. As with social structure, 
however, this must only reside at the meso-level where the consciousness of 
individuals can fuse on a norm into a single subjectivity. Thus Vierkandt could have 
made reference to Max Scheler’s Gesamtperson, Edith Stein’s überindividuelle 
Personlichkeit and Husserl’s Personon der hoherer Ordnung.50 They clarify that 
collective subjectivity does not mean a consciousness that is shared by many 
individuals; it is not a stand-aside substantial consciousness in its own right but a 
mutual participation in a common intentionality and subjectivity. Thus, each 
theorist does not speak of personhood but only personality. The personality therefore 
does not have a stream of consciousness. Its participants share a stream of 
experience.51  
For the Viennese art historian art and its reception is a relative or, as I would 
prefer to say, relational affair. Pächt notes that, ‘a work of the past or of another 
culture is based on premises that are not our own’, which he assigns to Riegl. Pächt 
obviously echoes Marx in the Eighteenth Brumaire here: ‘Men make their own 
history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves 
have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are 
directly confronted.’52 Pächt explains determinism in very unique ways that are 
owed to recognition of such ideas above, as digested by Metzger.  
Pächt explains his paradoxical notion of freedom in this way: ‘It is not the 
freedom to do as you please but the freedom to do the right thing, the one and only 
thing that makes sense is the context of a specific task. In other words it is tied to 
freedom.’53 This is where Pächt directly cites Metzger’s theory of ‘schöpferische 
Freiheit.’ Metzger was a second generation gestalt thinker and indeed pupil of the 
original gestalt theorists that Sedlmayr, and Pächt) had cited a generation earlier.54 
Metzger’s book grew from an earlier edition, which in turn was based on an article 
published during war time.55 The 1962 version that Pächt knew was the most 
successful, having incorporated Max Wertheimer’s results on obtaining insight in 
 
50 Max Scheler, ‘Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik’, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung 1, 1913/1916; Edith Stein, ‘Beiträge zur philosophischen Begru ndung der 
Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften’, in Edmund Husserl, ed., Jahrbuch fu r Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung 5, 1922: 158-175; Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. 
Texte aus dem Nachlass, 1921–1928,  in Husserliana, vol. XIV, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1973.  
51 Vandenberghe, ‘A Realist Theory of Collective Subjectivities;’ Emanuele Caminada, ‘Higher order 
Persons: an ontological Challenge’, Phenomenology and Mind. The On Line Journal of the Centre in 
Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person 1, 2011: 152-157.   
52 Pächt, Practice of Art History, 128; Karl Marx, ‘Eighteenth Brumaire’, in Surveys from Exile: Political 
Writings, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, vol. II, 146.  
53 Pächt, Practice of Art History, p. 132.  
54 See further Pächt, ‘Art Historians and Art Critics: Alois Riegl’, Burlington Magazine 105, 1963: 188-193.  
55 Wolfgang Metzger, ‘Zur Frage der Bildbarkeit schöpferischer Kräfte’, Arbeit und Betrieb 12, 1941: 60-
70; Die Grundlagen der Erziehung zu schöpferischer Freiheit, Frankfurt am Main, 1949,  2nd ed., 1962. For a 
discussion of these works, which Mitchell Ash calls a not perfectly successful mix of ’broad 
admonishments’, Buddhism and quietism, see Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism 
and the. Quest for Objectivity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 389.  Ian Verstegen                                     The ‘Second’ Vienna School as Social Science  
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problem solving in his Productive Thinking, 1945,  translated into German by 
Metzger in 1957.56 Like Wertheimer, Metzger strove to emphasize the objective 
quality of situational determinism, when a state of affairs impresses a choice on us, 
rather than another. Problems lead us with different forces toward solution; we are 
impelled to reach a satisfying end-state, free of contradiction and confusion. Clearly, 
this was an effective way for Pächt to make contact once again with Mannheim and 
ultimately Riegl, through a new way to fashion the idea of Wollen. But the 
relativistic fears of those critical of Riegl should be blunted, such as Gombrich, 
because this is not an irrational kind of determinism but a kind of ‘immanent 
structuralism.’57  
Pächt openly polemicizes with Gombrich. Now, Popper’s original problem 
with ‘historicism’ is that it absolved personal responsibility and this is what 
Gombrich charged of the woolly Romantic writing found in Sedlmayr’s Festschrift, 
which he wrote ‘absolve the individual of personal responsibility’, making those 
with such texts ‘enemies of reason.’58 Against fears of historicism, it should be 
remembered that the whole platform of Strukturforschung was centered on the single 
work of art and superseded stylistic history. The point was not to deduce grand 
schemes of history. Therefore, the historical dynamic of which Sedlmayr spoke 
should be understand on a moment-by-moment basis, as we have already seen with 
the idea of a ‘chain of development’, Entwicklungskette).59 This was actually the 
suggestion of Lewin, probably Sedlmayr’s most-cited Gestalt theorist, who 
recommended viewing the development of even physical and biological systems not 
as a continuous, teleological process but one in which the outcome is ‘being-such-as-
to-have-come-forth-from’, existentiellen Auseinanderhervorgegangenseins).60 The result 
is not holism but ‘moderate analytic holism’, ‘meso-gestalt’, or ‘intelligible holism’ 
defensible, it is required to do justice to art history.61   
 
56 Max Wertheimer, Productive Thinking, New York: Harper, 1945; German trans. W. Metzger, 
Produktives Denken, Frankfurt: Frankfurt 1957.  
57 Mitchell Ash, Gestalt Psychology in German Culture, 1890-1967: Holism and the. Quest for Objectivity, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  
58 E. H. Gombrich, Review of Kunstgeschichte und Kunsttheorie im 19. Jahrhundert, Probleme der 
Kunstwissenschaft, Berlin, 1963; Art Bulletin, 46, 1964: 418-20.  
59 Here, I would soften an earlier pronouncement that this phrase ‘historische Dynamik’ has to refer to 
a speculative history: Verstegen, ‘Gestalt, Art History, and Nazism’, Gestalt Theory 24, 2004: 134-150. It 
is now clear to me that Sedlmayr is referring merely to what we would call the ‘trajectory’ of history, 
rather than the teleology of history; c.f., Wright, Levine and Sober, Reconstructing Marxism, and Alex 
Callinicos, Theories and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History, Durham: Duke, 1995, 108.  
60 Kurt Lewin, Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte.  Eine Untersuchung zur 
vergleichenden Wissenschaftslehre, Berlin: Springer, 1922. Sedlmayr cites this work extensively; c.f., 
‘Materializing Strukturforschung’, in Dan Adler and Mitchell Frank, eds., German Art History and 
Scientific Thought Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012.  
61 Ian Verstegen, ‘Arnheim and Gombrich in Social Scientific Perspective’, Journal of the Theory of Social 
Behaviour 34, 2004: 91-102. The first characterization is due to Michael Ermarth, ‘Maurice Mandelbaum 
on History, Historicism, and Critical Reason’, Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism, 
London: Routledge, 2009; the second to Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano, 
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A suggestion that Kunstwollen is already functional is given by Pächt, when 
he writes of the ‘successive’ artistic activities of a school. He recognizes that the 
evolution of a school, of distinct individuals) and that of an, organically unified) 
individual is different. It is only the successive phases of a school that manifest the 
Kunstwollen. It is possible for Pächt to believe that history has a temporal pattern-
like structure because he denies the symmetry of prediction and explanation. He 
clearly distinguishes between prediction, inevitability, or determinism as a closed 
system, and retrospective causal determinism, endorsing Wind’s comment of 
‘retrospective prophecy.’62 This phrase, adopted by Wind from T. H. Huxley’s 
popular discussions of Darwin, refers to the ability to explain events retrospectively 
even as one incorporates contingency, ‘chance’ mutation).63 This distinction echoes 
post-positivist reforms to cover-law models in logical positivist philosophy of 
science, which viewed explanation and prediction as differing only in the arrow of 
time attached to them.64 
 
Conclusion 
 
Let us take stock. At the point of c. 1970 Pächt has followed Sedlmayr in the 1928 
‘Quintessenz’ essay to reinterpret Kunstwollen as a social scientific concept. Not 
following Vierkandt, Pächt nevertheless accepts that art history can solve the 
problem of artistic production relative to different periods by reference to sociology 
and psychology. This he does through the theory of Metzger. Such a theory is 
relational, emphasizing differential artistic responses at different times, causal in 
stressing that artistic choices are active compulsions responding to determinate 
states of affairs, and evolutionary or demonstrating the power of continuously 
evolving tradition over individual choice. Pächt hints at but does not directly solve 
some conundrums, for example, how continuous evolution adheres when history is 
not a closed system, the exact constitution of a group, and so forth. As for the first 
issue, he clearly states it as a methodological maxim that situational and tradition-
bound, evolutionary) explanations are to be preferred over those that first invoke 
the individual artistic agent.  
As a final clarification, we can follow Mandelbaum to see that there are two 
different problems here: ‘whether, in a given situation, a person can do what he 
wants to do’ and ‘why, in a given situation, a person chooses as he does.’65 The first 
refers to Wölfflin’s claim that ‘not everything is possible at all times.’66 This question 
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is in art and also in moral philosophy relatively uncontroversial. Riegl’s, and 
Dvořák’s and Sedlmayr’s) question is the second, why did a person choose as he or 
she did? Most people regard ‘freedom’ in terms of a lack of constraint placed by the 
past. With this Mandelbaum would agree. Such determinism, or lack of freedom) is 
in fact contemporaneous. In other words, we are determined by what we apprehend 
at any given moment. Mandelbaum explains: ‘our ability to respond to alternatives 
in terms of their own natures must be instilled in us by our past.  We must be 
trained, and sometimes brutally trained, by natural causation or by the actions of 
others, to become capable of a choice based not on the past but on the alternatives 
themselves.’67 Because we are trained by trial and error to lead our lives in a 
productive and safe way, our ‘determined’ choices do not seem to be that.  
The approach to art history and particularly the mysterious Kunstwollen 
needs to be contextualized historically, which allows a sympathetic understanding 
of the concept in general social scientific terms. In particular, the Kunstwollen must 
be seen as an evolving concept, which is how Dvořák, Mannheim, Sedlmayr and 
Pächt regarded it. By understanding it as an evolving concept aiming for empirical 
application, and also tracking the social scientific interests of thinkers like 
Mannheim, Vierkandt, Lewin or Metzger, it is possible to see that the Kunstwollen is 
none other than a concept of cultural explanation emphasizing art as an institution, 
with deterministic factors that, however, are rigorous in that they depend on point-
by-point readings and not teleologies. In this, my findings parallel my previous 
work on E. H. Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim. The accumulated weight of these 
results suggests that we need to resist filling in the blanks when confronted with 
someone with an unsavoury personal life like Hans Sedlmayr. We have to rethink 
how readily we connect Sedlmayr’s biography to his theories. Not only are the 
theories interesting, they are actually defensible and necessary to do justice to the 
tricky problem of the historical explanation of artistic style.  
In the end, Pächt’s contribution to the debate about Kunstwollen is one of 
maximizing the return of social science to explaining Wölfflin’s question, why art 
has a history. Rather than err on the side of caution as the Popper and Gombrich 
group did, he takes instead the tailor’s defence, and believes that if he cuts the cloth 
a little more generously, he will be more assured of ending up with the proper 
garment in the end. Perhaps the best monument to Pächt is to continue 
reinterpreting Kunstwollen in light of new insights from empirical social science.  
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